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In the last two decades a group of studies has beenemphasizing that the information 
technologies (ITs) present a ‘window of opportunities’ for latecomer countries to 
catch-up by developing indigenous software industrie  (Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 
2001). It has been observed that the availability of skilful human capital creates a base 
for the development of an IT industry by latecomer countries. The software industry 
is, in principle, a low-capital but knowledge and skill-intensive industry, and the 
international market for software is big and growing (OECD, 2004; Steinmueller, 
2004). For this reason, the discussion about developing indigenous software industries 
in the latecomer context has gained particular attention both in academic and policy 
literature for more than a decade (Schware, 1989, 19 2; Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 
2001; UNIDO, 1988).  
 
However, developing a software industry in a latecomer or less-advanced context is 
not a straightforward task. To be successful and sustainable in time the development 
of the industry needs to involve accumulation of technological capabilities needed to 
enter into global markets for products and services as well as provide the basis for 
domestic growth and employment in software activities.  Technological capabilities 
for software development are difficult to accumulate in a latecomer context for two 
main reasons. First, accumulating technological knowledge is a complex process, 
which requires not only acquisition of codified knowledge but also, and more so, 
development of tacit expertise, i.e. deeper understanding about technologies. Second, 
in order to build technological capabilities, the latecomers need to develop mastery 
over an array of highly complex skills and abilities, while the knowledge and 
expertise, which they possess, may be rather limited, and thus make the shift 
challenging, if not impossible. The success in building capabilities depends entirely 
on the latecomer companies’ deliberate efforts to upgrade. Although very few 
latecomer companies have managed to enter the international markets for software 
and related services, the relative success of India, China and Brazil (Arora, 2001; 
Athreye, 2005; Botelho, 2005; Tschang, 2005) has amplified the need to examine the 
contribution of technological capabilities as well as other factors to entry and 
development1.  
 
In examining the specific technological capabilities the indigenous latecomer software 
companies need to develop in order to be able to compete in international markets, the 
current literature identifies some candidates for fu ther examination but fails to 
systematically address the precise nature and extent of these capabilities.   
 
The discussion about capabilities building can be traced back to the seminal works of 
Schware (1989; 1992), Correa (1996) and Heeks (2002), which were discussing the 
entry strategies for latecomer software industries. Despite their mention of capabilities 
as an important driver in this development, neither of the studies provides a specific 
framework for analyzing the acquisition or ‘upgrading’ of capabilities in a latecomer 
software industry.  
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In research on indigenous software companies in India, China and Brazil as well as 
other developing countries capabilities are sometimes mentioned as an important 
driver, but few scholars have examined the context of echnological capabilities 
building and few of them have attempted to provide analytical framework for 
investigating capabilities in the context of latecomer development, (for studies on a 
number of developing countries, see (Arora, 2005; Carmel, 2003; Heeks, 2002; 
Minevich, 2005), for India (Arora, 2001; Athreye, 2005; Tschang, 2001), for China 
(Tschang, 2005), for China vs. India (Contractor, 2004; Tschang, 2003), and for 
Brazil (Botelho, 2005). Even among those who did so, there are significant gaps, as 
the review in section 3 reveals.  
 
This paper develops an approach for analyzing technological capabilities in a 
latecomer software industry, taking into account the specifics not only of the 
latecomer context, but also of the nature of software capabilities. The proposed 
approach identifies and disentangles a wide array of technical and organizational 
capabilities, which the latecomer software companies n ed to build, if they are to 
develop internationally competitive software industries based on indigenous 
resources. The paper also contributes to the field of technological development in the 
latecomer context by developing a systematic approach for analysing the array of 
organizational capabilities associated with technological capabilities building.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section 2 makes an overview of the 
concept of technological capabilities building. Section 3 presents the specifics in 
analyzing the technological capabilities in the software industry. Section 4 examines 
systematically the technological capabilities, which the latecomer software companies 
need to develop. The final section 5 draws conclusions and policy implications and 
outlines directions for further research. 
 
2. The concept of technological capabilities building 
A number of scholars agree that, to be successful and sustainable over time, 
technological development in a latecomer or less-advanced context needs to involve 
technological capabilities building (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 
2000; Lall, 1992). Technological capabilities building involve a deliberate process of 
learning and technology upgrading by the latecomer companies directed at the 
accumulation of knowledge and skills and their commercial application.  
 
Technological capabilities can be further defined as encompassing “the great variety 
of knowledge and skills which firms need so that they can acquire, assimilate, use, 
adapt, change and create technology…. (Ernst, et al, 1998, p. 17).  Ernst notes that 
this is “a broad definition, which goes beyond engineering and technical know-how 
and includes organizational know-how” (ibid). 
 
From a research perspective, perhaps the greatest challenge in analysing the 
technological capability is that it is non-observable.  Unlike R&D expenditure, the 
purchase of technologies or the hiring of skilled personnel, for example, it is difficult 
to measure and assess technological capability.  In their attempts to overcome this 
limitation, scholars have begun to develop taxonomies of technological capabilities2. 
 
The early studies about technological capabilities w re focusing predominantly on the 
acquisition of capabilities or expertise that latecomers need to master directly new 
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technologies, and these were classified as production, linkage and investment 
capabilities (Bell, 1993; Lall, 1992), or as production, linkage and innovation 
capabilities (Westphal, 1985). One of the latest studies (Ernst, 1998) explicitly 
emphasizes that organizational capabilities are integral elements of the technological 
capabilities (see the definition above). Despite these useful elements, the taxonomy of 
technological capabilities, which scholars have proposed, namely production, 
investment, and minor and major change capabilities, is omewhat generic and largely 
similar to more general studies of technological development process.  The inclusion 
of two organizational capabilities, the capability for strategic thinking and the linkage 
capability is similarly useful, but falls short of a sufficient elaboration of 
technological capabilities to make a sufficiently detailed account of the role of the 
organizational capabilities to have much practical value.  
 
Somewhat more useful has been the emphasis on learning as a critical driver in the 
process of technological capabilities building (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Hobday, 1995; 
Kim, 1997; 1999; Kim, 2000; Marcelle, 2004). The ability to learn is in essence an 
organizational capability, as it is shaped by company’s attitude towards new ideas, 
and the openness, flexibility and aptitude to accomm date them.  
 
This emphasis on organizational issues distinguishes t  more recent studies above 
from earlier studies, where learning was portrayed predominantly in terms of 
acquisition of technical expertise. However, it is al o important for latecomers to 
develop organizational skills - managing new technologies is not only about expertise 
in understanding their nature and requirements, but it also requires substantial 
organizational abilities to manage the application of this expertise. It is in this sense 
that organizational capabilities can be seen as critical drivers in the process of 
accumulation of technological knowledge, as they introduce the dynamics of the 
underlying learning process. Therefore, studies need to scrutinize how the learning 
process operates if they are to provide a coherent framework for analyzing 
technological capabilities building in a latecomer context. 
 
The requirements of learning are related to the new emphasis on organizational 
capabilities such as linkage capabilities and capabilities for strategic thinking for 
example.  Authors have suggested that, to become succe sful, latecomers need to be 
open and flexible and possess certain organizational skills (Bell and Pavitt, 1993).  
This has became more explicit in the latest studies which emphasize that it is exactly 
the deployment of organizational capabilities, like open organizational structures, 
active communication within and with external sources (Ernst, et al, 1998) 
expeditious learning and crisis construction (Kim, 1997), integrative learning efforts 
(Marcelle, 2004), organizational arrangements facilit ting active knowledge 
management (Kim and Nelson, 2000), that lay the underpinning of successful 
technological upgrade in latecomer companies. Other studies (Dutrenit, 2000) have 
revealed that the absence of and difficulties in building organizational capabilities in 
latecomer context undermine the process of technological building. However, a full 
account of organizational capabilities, which the latecomer companies need to master, 
is still absent in the literature.   
 
Building upon the existing research, this paper makes an attempt to provide more 
detailed account of the organizational capabilities, alongside the technical capabilities, 
which the latecomer companies need to develop to be a l  to master new 
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technologies. Although the proposed framework refers to the software industry, the 
outlined organizational capabilities can be adapted to other latecomer industries. 
 
The principle ideas, which provide the basis for this paper’s examination of 
capabilities building are 1) that capabilities are gained incrementally, 2) that there are 
a limited number of ‘sequences’ by which capabilities might be build, and 3) that 
there are important thresholds in the process of capabilities accumulation.  The last of 
these ideas is particularly important.  It is not only the capabilities to acquire and use 
new technologies that must be constructed, but also, and more importantly, the 
capabilities to generate innovation to a certain degre  – from generation of 
incremental change and modification in acquired technologies to introducing new 
technologies (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Figueiredo, 2001; Hobday, 2000; Marcelle, 
2004). Studies (Bell, 1993; Figueiredo, 2001; Hobday, 2000; Kim, 1997) have 
emphasized that it is crucial to distinguish between production and innovative 
capabilities, as these reflect completely different se  of accumulated skills by the 
latecomer companies. Developing production capabilities nvolve accumulating skills 
and abilities to operate new technologies, while building innovative capabilities is a 
far more cumbersome task. To build innovative capabilities the latecomers need to 
deepen their knowledge and understanding about the new technologies to the extent 
that they will be able to change and modify the new t chnologies, and eventually to 
introduce new technologies. 
 
The incremental and sequential building of technological capabilities is by no means a 
passive, mechanistic or automatic process. Rather, it is a deliberate process of 
learning and accumulation of various knowledge and skills, and their combination, in 
attempt to develop mastery over the new technologies (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; 
Hobday, 1995, 2000; Kim, 1997). The initiation of a process of technological 
capabilities building comes as a result of a deliberate learning effort by the latecomer 
companies aimed at technological upgrading. Building upon a foundation of 
production experience, a further set of skills and capabilities are required for 
companies to embark on a technological capabilities building trajectory.  
 
A particularly useful study by Figueiredo (2001) focuses on the transition from 
production to innovative capabilities. It disaggregated routine production capabilities 
and innovative capabilities, and identified the intermediate capabilities within them. 
The underlying idea behind this model is the sequence in building innovative 
capabilities, and the cumbersome transition from routine production capabilities 
towards accumulating innovative capabilities. 
 
In partial summary, the requirements for a framework of capabilities building are that 
it needs to consider the incremental and sequential nature of technological capabilities 
acquisition and to recognize that there is an important threshold between ‘operating’ a 
technology and making significant adaptations and changes in the technology, which 
require an innovative capability that is an important threshold in the capabilities 
acquisition process.  To these inherent features of the capabilities accumulation 
process, it is also necessary to add specific featur s related to the latecomer context 
and to the context of the software industry. 
 
Latecomer companies face difficulties in crossing the threshold of developing 
innovation capabilities for a couple of reasons. First, being distant from lead-users, 
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the latecomers do not have access to information and knowledge about the latest 
technological developments or the precise evolution of user requirements. Second, 
demand within the latecomer domestic market is lesssophisticated technologically 
than the demand in the lead markets, which makes it difficult for the domestic market 
to become a training ground for technological capabilities building, which might 
subsequently be deployed in international markets. Third, the domestic research and 
education infrastructure often does not provide the lat comers with suitably-trained 
graduates; gaps may exist in both practical management and in information and 
knowledge about frontier technological developments. All these make the process of 
technological capabilities building a cumbersome task for the latecomer companies. 
 
Exploring the technological capabilities in a latecomer software industry presents 
another challenge. So far, studies analyzing the process of technological capabilities 
have been predominantly focused on the industrial sector, studying development of 
the electronics industry (Gee, 1998; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; Mytelka, 1998), 
textiles (Gee, 1998; Lall, 1987), pulp and paper industry (Figueiredo, 2001), steel 
industry (Dutrenit, 2000; Lall, 1987), telecommunicat ons (Marcelle, 2004), etc. In 
addition to that, very few studies have been exploring the development of a latecomer 
software industry, placing capabilities as a point of the analysis (Athreye, 2005; 
Heeks, 1998; Tschang, 2001, 2003). Their contributions and shortcomings are 
outlined below, as well as the fact that so far, the concept of the technological 
capabilities building has not been applied to the software industry, which is the aim of 
this paper. As the predominant part of the studies have been directed at exploring 
technological capabilities in industrial sector, the analytical framework developed in 
the field so far has been reflecting the specifics of the industrial sector. However, to 
be able to provide a coherent account, a study investigating the technological 
capabilities in a latecomer software industry needs to take into account the specifics 
of the software industry, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Specifics in analyzing technological capabilities in the software industry 
A study about the technological capabilities building n the software industry needs to 
reflect the specific characteristics of the industry. First, software production, more 
than any other industrial activity, is almost by definition an innovation activity 
because it aims to produce new products or new ways of executing known tasks and 
functions (Torrisi, 1998). Therefore, when analyzing the technological capabilities in 
the software industry, the distinction between production capabilities and capabilities 
to innovate becomes blurred. To produce software solutions latecomer companies 
must possess some capabilities to innovate. The significance of novelty, which 
governs the extent of innovative capability needed, varies among different software 
projects and is discussed later.   
 
Second, the degree of innovativeness depends on companies’ abilities, but also on 
customers’ requirements. If a latecomer software company operates in a market with 
less sophisticated technological demand, it may produce software solutions, which are 
innovative for that market, but behind the frontier t chnological developments in 
international markets. Hence, accepting the inherent innovative nature of the software 
production, it is also meaningful to distinguish betw en innovation for international 
markets and innovation for the domestic market, especially when the latter is a 
latecomer context.  
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Third, the software industry is a human capital-intensive industry, rather than a 
physical capital-intensive industry. Development of successful software products or 
services depends on the deployment of skills and capabilities of the computer 
engineers. The challenge, which the latecomer software companies face, is to build 
technological capabilities enabling them to produce software, which can be 
commercialized abroad, based on the skills and abilities, which computer engineers 
have acquired in a latecomer context.  
 
Due to the specifics of the software production, we need to scrutinize each of the 
constituent capabilities in the set of the technological capabilities. The development of 
a software industry has gained a particular attention in the literature recently, due to 
the spectacular outbursts of software development activities in a number of 
latecomers. Some analyzes have mentioned capabilities as an important driver in the 
latecomer software industries development, but none f them had provided an 
analytical framework of how to analyze them. Review of the main studies about 
development of latecomer software industries is done below, outlining their 
contributions and shortcomings. 
 
The seminal works of Schware (1989; 1992), Correa (1996) and Heeks (2002) have 
outlined capabilities as a critical factor enabling latecomer software companies to 
enter international markets. Some of the recent studies investigating the remarkable 
outbreaks of indigenous software development activities in a number of developing 
countries, like India, China and Brazil (see for example among many others, for all 
developing countries (Arora, 2005; Carmel, 2003; Minevich, 2005), for India (Arora, 
2001; Athreye, 2005), for China (Tschang, 2005), for China vs. India (Contractor, 
2004), for Brazil (Botelho, 2005) also have mentioned capabilities as an important 
driver in the latecomer software industries development. But none of the above 
studies had provided an analytical framework of how t  analyze the capabilities. 
 
Attempts to provide a framework for analyzing the capabilities, which the latecomer 
software companies need to develop, have been done by Tschang (2001; 2003) and by 
Heeks (1998). Although these papers introduce the problem, they have significant 
limitations. 
 
In discussing the development of the Rumanian software industry Heeks (1998) 
employs a theoretical framework based upon technological capabilities building and 
provides a taxonomy of the software technological capabilities. The study outlines 
different software production activities representing different phases in climbing the 
technological ladder to perform more sophisticated software production. However, it 
is focused only on a range of software creating activities, rather than on the 
capabilities underlying these activities and no attempt is made to consider whether 
this array should be adjusted for the latecomer context. Further, the theoretical 
framework seems decoupled from the empirical section, which explores 
predominantly the institutional foundations (and their transformation) and briefly 
touches upon the development of software activities in the latecomer software 
industry in question, and thus does not provide a cle r approach of how to apply the 
proposed framework. 
 
Tschang (2001) examines capabilities in terms of a software development model. 
Such an approach is insufficient to provide a systematic account of the range of 
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capabilities, which latecomer software companies need to develop in order to compete 
in international markets. In Tschang (2003), the author abandons the first approach of 
deriving the capabilities from the software development model. Rather, it provides a 
list of capabilities, namely individual technical skills, process maturity, management 
capability, technology, revenue model and product marketing capability. Although 
relevant and operational, this list omits important elements. It focuses on the 
‘outcome’ capabilities but ignores the ‘enabling’ capabilities, like capabilities to 
monitor technological development and identify potential niches, capabilities for 
strategic thinking, linkage capabilities, capabilities to establish dynamic 
organizational learning environment, etc. It is exactly the ‘enabling’ capabilities that 
enable the latecomers to gain competitive position at a first place, and also, and more 
so, to ensure sustaining it in time. 
 
A recent book by Arora and Gambardella (2005) analyzes the underpinnings of the 
successful development of the software industries in several latecomer countries, 
among them India, China and Brazil. Alongside the sp cific developments in the 
individual countries, the study outlines the driving forces in the development of a 
software industry in a latecomer context. Capabilities emerge as an important driver 
underlying the success of these latecomers, as emphasized in the individual countries’ 
chapters (see (Athreye, 2005), in particular; also (B telho, 2005; Tschang, 2005) and 
in the conclusions (Arora, 2005). 
 
Despite the explicit emphasis of their importance, the analysis does not provide a 
unified framework for analyzing capabilities. In the individual chapters, the analysis 
of capabilities is combined with the rest of the factors affecting the industry 
development, and it is the sources of the incubation of capabilities that remain the 
focal points of the analysis, rather than a detailed analysis of the capabilities 
themselves (with the exception of Athreye’s discussed further below).  A similar bias 
applies to the conclusions, which despite emphasizing the importance of firms’ 
capabilities remains focused on the sources of firms’ capabilities rather than on 
capabilities themselves (Arora, 2005). An explicit framework considering the specific 
elements of technological capabilities building in the latecomer context and a 
connection with the literature in the field of technological developments in latecomer 
contexts are both absent. 
 
The study by Athreye (2005) deserves further attention. Although it does not provide 
an analytical framework nor does it explore the issue of technological capabilities 
building systematically, it does capture and portray he underlying idea of capabilities 
building. Exploring the development of the Indian software industry and the success 
factors contributing to its development, Athreye (2005) observes that the evolutionary 
development of capabilities underpins the Indian success. Through an excellent 
review and analysis of development of the Indian software industry, the study reveals 
that the Indian companies had entered the internatio l markets by providing basic 
programming skills, but over time they have developd specialised expertise and in 
few cases domain expertise. Further, the study emphasizes that it is the dynamic 
organizational capabilities, which the companies had developed over time, like the 
shift from on-site to offshore business model, organiz tional capabilities in human 
resource and organizational practices, large-scale projects management, etc. that 
ensured the Indian success in international markets. 
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A range of paths, including outsourcing or developing own products and services for 
domestic or international markets, lay before latecomers. Athreye’s focus on 
outsourcing software products and services is just one of these paths.  In the case of 
outsourcing for international markets, capabilities building would be heavily 
influenced by learning spillovers from multinational enterprises. Different paths may 
well require and call upon different capabilities, which latecomer companies need to 
master. For example, outsourcing will require a set of skills, which will be limited and 
significantly narrower than the set of skills required for companies to produce their 
own products and services. 
 
Furthermore, the Indian outsourcing model is a specific example, as the Indian 
success lies on ‘the winning combination of particular organizational capabilities and 
new business models that differentiate Indian software firms from other software 
providers in the global marketplace’ (Athreye, 2005, p. 36).  Therefore, the more 
general question of what kind of capabilities the latecomer software companies need 
to muster in order to become competitive in international markets on the basis of 
indigenous resources remain to a great extent open.  
 
Torrisi (1998) investigates the capabilities that software companies need to master. 
However, this study analyzes the Western European software industry, and thus, 
explores a software industry in a developed countries context. As underlined above, 
development of a latecomer software industry is rather different from that in 
developed countries context. To develop successfully, latecomer companies need to 
compensate for the environment, in which they are embedded in, and to do so, they 
need to put deliberate efforts in developing an array of technological capabilities, 
starting from the basic technical capabilities.  
 
In analyzing the capabilities, which European software companies possess, Torrisi has 
outlined five capabilities: capabilities in mathematics, computer science, system 
engineering, experience with application server, and marketing (Torrisi, 1998, p. 136). 
However, if we are to explore in-depth the technological capabilities of latecomer 
software companies, this list of technological capabilities is rather limited for two of 
reasons. First, Torrisi seems to assume that the basic technical capabilities are 
sufficient to ensure competitive performance. Thus, it omits important technical 
capabilities, which companies need to master to be abl  to produce software products 
and services, like for example, capabilities to develop specialised expertise in a 
particular domain, capabilities to diversify the products and services offered, etc. In 
this sense, Torrisi’s list is limited and does not exhaust the capabilities associated with 
software production, neither in a latecomer context nor in advanced context. Second, 
if they are to become successful, the latecomer software companies in particular need 
to develop mastery over a wide array of organization l capabilities, which go well 
beyond the single organizational capability listed by Torrisi, marketing capability.  
 
The following section attempts to fill the gaps and complete the analysis begun by the 
authors discussed in this section, with a particular focus on analysis and attempt to 






4. Approach for analyzing technological capabilities in a latecomer software 
industry 
To be able to produce software products or services, a latecomer company needs to 
develop an array of capabilities. Table 1 below summarizes the technical and 
organizational capabilities constituting integral prts of the technological capability, 
which the latecomer software companies need to develop. The subsequent sub-
sections examine the two sets of capabilities, technical and organizational, and within 
these sub-sections each of the listed capabilities is briefly discussed.   
 
Table 1 



























4.1. Technical capabilities 
The technical capabilities discussion is organised by a classification of technical 
capabilities as basic, intermediate and advanced.   
 
The capabilities, which constitute the minimal core technical capabilities, which any 
software company needs to possess in order to undertake software development 
activities, are classified as basic technical capabilities. The first basic technical 
capability, which the latecomer software companies ed to develop, is the capability 
for software design. It is associated with the phase of inception of software 
development, when software companies need to design how the software will look 
and perform based on identified clients’ needs. To develop expertise in software 
design the latecomer software companies need to develop understanding about the 
design of system architectures. They need to be abl to design an architecture that 
Technical capabilities 
Basic 
Capabilities for software design 
Capabilities for software programming 
Intermediate 
Capabilities in various operating environments  
Capabilities for network applications 
Capabilities for high quality assurance 
Advanced 
Capabilities to develop specialised expertise in a particular domain 
Capabilities to diversify the products and services offered 
Capabilities for introducing minor, moderate and major innovation 
 
Organizational capabilities 
Establishment of organizational culture facilitating learning 
Capabilities for effective management 
Capabilities for prompt delivery 
Capabilities to manage small and large projects 
Linkage capabilities 
Marketing capabilities 
Capabilities to monitor technical change and to identify niches for 
potential developments 
Capabilities for strategic thinking 
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reflects and balances the different needs of user stakeholders; to identify the 
architecturally significant aspects of design, including frequently overlooked areas 
such as performance, resilience, and location; to use perspectives to ensure that their 
architecture exhibits important qualities such as performance, scalability, and security. 
Alongside these, the latecomers need to develop deeer understanding about design 
techniques, which involves building knowledge and expertise about graphics design, 
website design, multimedia solutions, etc. All these illustrate the range of capabilities 
and skills, associated with software design, which latecomers need to develop. 
 
The second basic technical capability, the capability for software programming, is 
associated with the next phase in the production of a software product or service, 
which is the actual writing of the software. Knowledge about software programming 
languages and techniques, and platforms creates the bas  for actual writing of the 
software. However, latecomers need to develop deep understanding about software 
programming. They need to build expertise about algorithms, software programming 
languages, etc. Building expertise in scripting languages for WWW data (e.g. Java, 
XML, JavaScript, HTML, CSS, XSL, XSLT, C++, C and Object-C) requires 
developing understanding about their comparative utility for specific application 
contexts. Further, mastering one of these languages requires developing deeper 
understanding about it. For example, to develop excellent programming skills the 
latecomers need not only to learn the syntax of the Java programming language, but 
also object-oriented programming with the Java programming language; creating 
graphical user interfaces (GUI), exceptions, file input/output (I/O), threads and 
networking. The capabilities for software programming include expertise in system 
analysis. The purpose of system analysis is to produce a list of functionalities that the 
system should provide, to describe the functions that t e system should perform, and 
to specify the business logic underlying the processing of data, including analysing 
what data is to be stored and used by the system, and how the user interface should 
work.  To develop capabilities for system analysis the latecomers companies need to 
develop deep understanding about different platforms, functionality, user interfaces, 
and to also achieve a good understanding of the undrlying business processes, which 
the software solution is meant to support.  
 
The basic technical capabilities alone are insufficient for a software company to 
establish itself, and they need to be augmented further with intermediate technical 
capabilities for the latecomers to be able to perform adequately technical tasks and to 
become competitive. 
 
Alongside building capabilities for software design a d programming, the latecomer 
software companies may need also to build capabilities in various operating 
environments, to be able of responding to various clients’ needs and requirements. 
Although Windows operating system is the dominant computer platform, other 
operating systems like Linux, Unix and Mac are also u ed. Therefore, the latecomer 
software companies need to be aware that opting for lea ning software design, 
programming and networking only on the dominant platform instead of building 
expertise in all existing platforms may involve costs or lost business. This type of 
business loss is not necessarily fatal and can be perceived as an incentive for 
companies to broaden their expertise by learning to undertake software activities also 
in other platforms, to be able to better respond to customers’ requirements. 
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Creating a modern software product or service very often requires capabilities for 
networking applications. The networking applications i clude any kind of software 
solution, which operates in a network environment. A wide range of software 
solutions nowadays involve networking. For example, the information system in a 
company represents a network (i.e. intranet). Simultaneously, the companies are using 
software solutions operating in Internet (i.e. web-based solutions), while executing 
their every day operations for document sharing, coordination, communication, 
payment, etc. Therefore, the software company, which develops a new software 
solution for a client, needs to take into account the access by multiple users to the 
network resources such as files and to ensure security over the access as well as 
dealing with the need for ‘file locking’ to prevent simultaneous editing by different 
users of the same data. To be able to develop reliabl  networking applications the 
latecomer software companies need to build expertise in security engineering. They 
need to develop understanding about the network operating systems, security 
protocols, techniques for specifying and implementing a security policy, etc. This may 
present a cumbersome task for the latecomers, as network security is among the most 
dynamic fields, which has been rapidly developing recently. 
 
Applying all of the above capabilities, the latecomer companies need to deliver high 
quality products and services, if they are to be successful. In order to deliver high 
quality products and services, latecomers need to build capabilities for software 
quality assurance, the last of the intermediate capabilities, in which reliability is the 
central issue. Developing capabilities for software quality assurance is a focus of 
attention among practitioners and academics, and has resulted in creation of quality 
assurance guidelines, reflected both in ISO certification scheme and the Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) assessment scheme. Whether certified under one of these 
schemes, or not, latecomer software companies need to apply software quality 
assurance techniques to insure the quality and reliability of the software they deliver. 
Rigorous testing, de-bugging and defect elimination are critical steps in insuring the 
quality of the produced software.  
 
If latecomer companies are to climb the technological ladder, they need to develop 
advanced technical capabilities allowing them to manage their knowledge base, and to 
combine and re-combine their accumulated expertise.  
 
The first of the ‘advanced’ technical capabilities that is vital for latecomers to 
establish is specialised expertise and depth of understanding in a particular domain.  
Developing a deep understanding and expertise about fr ntier technologies is 
particularly challenging for latecomer companies as they are embedded in a latecomer 
context, as mentioned above, and therefore, developing expertise by focussing on a 
particular domain appears to be a more realistic strategy for the latecomer companies 
to secure their attempts for technological upgrading.  
 
For instance, good knowledge and understanding of finance and banking system is 
required, if a software company is to create finance or banking software solution. The 
task becomes even more daunting, if a latecomer company seeks to develop finance or 
banking solution for international markets, where operations are far more complex 
and sophisticated; and therefore, the latecomer company needs to put deliberate 
efforts to develop deeper understanding about its specifics. A second example is the 
development of ERP systems. To be able to build an ERP system, a latecomer 
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software company needs to develop an understanding about not only the structure of 
the ERP systems but also knowledge and understanding of corporate practices in a 
particular market and a particular industry in which the system is to be employed.   
 
The capability to diversify their products and services (the second of the advanced 
technical capabilities) is perhaps the most difficult to achieve by latecomer software 
companies. The software companies are specialised suppliers according to Pavitt’s 
(1984) taxonomy, i.e. companies providing specialised products. Being specialised 
suppliers does not preclude diversification. Companies can diversify their products 
and services within their specialised niche. Diversifying the range of products and 
services, which a company offers, creates an opportunity for companies in lead 
economies to reap greater benefit from their knowledge base by reusing it in different 
contexts. The same holds for the prospects of latecom r companies to reap greater 
benefits by diversifying the range of their products and services. At the same time, it 
remains much harder for latecomer companies to succeed in diversification, due to the 
limited access to frontier technological knowledge and knowledge of the application 
domain in other countries they have, being embedded in a latecomer environment. 
Once the latecomer companies have developed expertise in a particular domain, they 
may decide to broaden the range of products and services they offer, based on the 
experience and knowledge they have, or market opportunities they perceive.  
 
The degree of diversification may vary. Diversifying by introducing new products or 
services, which require the latecomer company to enter a new domain, which is 
completely separate from the domain in which the company has accumulated 
expertise so far is associated with high risk for any company, especially latecomers. 
Diversifying by introducing new products or services, which are close to the existing 
range, and to the already accumulated expertise in a particular field, is far less risky 
endeavor for companies, especially when they are lat comers. For example, 
developing a modular web-based platform for automated billing, invoicing and 
customer management for the one spectrum of services, for example Voice-over-IP 
involves lower technological efforts and leads to lower degree of diversification in a 
company which has previously developed a modular web-based platform for 
automated billing, invoicing and customer managements for a spectrum of services 
like Internet, triple play, WiMAX and regular voice communication services. 
Introducing systems able to address all of these applications will require significantly 
higher technological efforts and will result in a higher degree of diversification for a 
company than simply developing an automated billing application for one application. 
Such diversification may, however, be necessary to provide a competitive offering to 
those being offered by rivals.  This sort of diversification is a difficult task for 
latecomers, given that they need to maintain the depth of expertise in a particular 
domain and, at the same time, to broaden the range of the products and services 
within that domain and, perhaps, also to broaden th expertise in different domains.  
 
Last, but perhaps the most important of the ‘advanced’ technical capabilities, are the 
capabilities for introducing minor, moderate or major innovation. The extent to which 
a latecomer company has been able to accumulate a variety of skills and abilities to 
master new technologies reflects on its innovative capabilities, its capacity to 
combine, re-combine and deploy its expertise.  
 
As underlined above, innovativeness is an intrinsic characteristic of the software 
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production and yet the degree of innovativeness mayvar . This point is particularly 
important in studying the latecomer software industry, as it requires the research to 
disentangle the software innovation process and to classify the software production in 
terms of its degree of innovativeness. So far this ha not been done for software 
production in the latecomer context and the following analysis attempts to address this 
point.  
 
The innovative component is inherent to the very nature of software production, as 
outlined by Torrisi (1998). However, different types of software production activities 
involve different level of innovative efforts and respectively, result in software 
products and services with different degree of innovativeness inbuilt in them. 
Software services like re-coding legacy applications i to more modern computer 
languages, data migration, or resolving specific inompatibilities between similar 
systems, etc, involve a relatively small innovative component. On the other hand, 
producing software customized services and software p ckages usually involve higher 
degree of innovativeness. For example, to successfully launch an ERP or CRM 
system, or e-commerce solution, a latecomer software company needs to deploy 
sophisticated knowledge and expertise, and to offera solution, which is comparable to 
the frontier technological developments in that particular domain. Therefore, it is 
meaningful to distinguish between capabilities for minor, moderate and major 
innovation, when studying the degree of innovative efforts associated with producing 
particular software products or services.  
 
The proportion of activities like re-coding, data migration, resolving incompatibility, 
etc. can be expected to account for a significant share in the software services offered 
by latecomer companies. On the other hand, the presenc  of major innovative 
activities, like creation of packages or customized s rvices, despite their small share 
in the latecomer software developments, signals the existence of potentially 
significant innovative capabilities in the latecomers. This makes it important to 
analyze the type of software activities which the latecomer companies offer, and the 
type of innovative capabilities (i.e. degree of innovativeness) they involve.  
 
As the capability for minor, moderate and major innovation reflects the level of 
technological maturity, which the company has achieved, it is classified as advanced 
technical capability. This does not imply that it develops last among all capabilities. 
On the contrary, it emerges with application of the basic technical capabilities (due to 
the innovative nature of every software activity) and deepens further alongside 
development of the rest of technical capabilities. A  it affects the way the rest of the 
technical capabilities are mobilized, its level of development does reflect the level of 
technological sophistication of the company and for this reason it can be treated as 
advanced technical capability.  
 
4.2. Organizational capabilities 
As outlined in section 2, the development of organiz tional capabilities is particularly 
important in the process of technological capabilities building by the latecomers. The 
proposed approach makes an attempt to outline a setof organizational capabilities, 
which the latecomer companies need to develop, and although these are applied to the 
case of the software industry, they can be easily adapted to any other latecomer 
industry. As the approach aims to outline the organizational capabilities in latecomer 
companies, it identifies and classifies the capabilities taking into account the specifics 
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of the latecomer context. It bears an element of idi syncrasy, as although it uses ideas 
from management literature, it adopts them to the specifics of the latecomer context. 
It deliberately disentangles the organizational capabilities reaching a low level of 
desegregation. Further, it places emphasis even on basic organizational capabilities, 
like organizing, communication and control, as the lat comer companies may lack or 
possess limited capacity even in such basic management capabilities.  
 
The first of the organizational capabilities, the ability to establish organizational 
culture facilitating learning can be considered as the most fundamental capability, as 
it underlines the development of all technical and organizational capabilities.  The 
ability to learn is shaped by company’s attitude towards new ideas, and the openness, 
flexibility and aptitude to accommodate them. Developing “learning to learn” 
capability can be challenging. Accumulating new information and knowledge and 
developing capabilities to master new technologies often requires adopting new 
perspectives in dealing with problems, new ideas, new ways of approaching a 
problem and finding a solution, and developing new ways of executing known or new 
tasks. It may also challenge some already established routines in the company, and 
require ‘unlearning’ and abandoning some of them. All these require openness. The 
latecomer companies therefore need to establish an environment for accumulation of 
information, exchange of ideas, and knowledge generation and re-combination. To 
achieve that, the whole organization needs to be ‘tuned’ into a learning mode, a mode 
which appears to require a degree of openness and exploration. Learning inevitably 
involves change. Adopting new ideas and developments often necessitates undergoing 
some sort of change. In this sense, abilities to learn are closely coupled with change 
management skills. Case studies of successful technological development often 
confirm that it was indeed the change management capabilities that underpin dynamic 
technological and organizational learning (Kim, 1997; 1999; Kim, 2000; Marcelle, 
2004). Further research is yet to be conducted to delve into the complexity of 
developing organizational capabilities by the latecomers.  
 
The abilities to establish organizational culture facilitating learning constitute 
essential elements of the capabilities for effective management. The former have been 
outlined separately, as they represent the major driver of the process of technological 
capabilities building. The latter, the second of the organizational capabilities, is no 
less important.  Every single aspect of organization l functioning is affected and 
indeed shaped by a company’s management. The vision of what and where the 
organization should be in the future and the strategy for pursuing it are driven by 
managerial decisions. Organizational processes, like communication, decision-
making, coordination, control, etc. are contingent o  management strategy and 
decisions. A company with effective management involves its members in active 
communication with each other, participatory decision-making and well-coordinated 
activities; and team building and working in a team re essential elements in the 
organizational culture. Establishing effective management practices can appear a 
difficult task for any company, but it is particularly difficult for latecomers, due to 
their limited business experience. Strict hierarchy and/or restrictions in 
communication and decision-making about routine activities and new developments 
may produce uneven information flows and ‘gate keeping’. In its extreme form this 
may result in rigid organizational structures and restricted information exchange 
flows, and will be detrimental to learning and technological capabilities building in 
the company. 
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Overcoming organizational rigidities requires an interactive and open environment in 
the organization which makes it possible to be receptiv  to new ideas and new 
developments. Moving towards this pattern from the heritage of more hierarchical and 
controlled interaction requires change management activities. Change management 
activities affect company’s activities in all levels: tasks performed by individuals, 
various organizational processes (communication, decision making, coordination, 
control, etc.), overall strategic vision, organizational culture, etc. In order to perform 
effective change management the organizations need to constantly monitor their 
activities and the signals by the external environme t, and to undertake re-adjustments 
in the organization. All above illustrates the complexity, which the latecomers face in 
developing effective management abilities, enabling them to master the organizational 
and technical dynamics underpinning the development of ew technologies.  
 
The third of the organizational capabilities, which the latecomer software companies 
need to build, is the capability for prompt delivery. Meeting deadlines is crucial, as 
failure to do so result in increasing costs of project and customer dissatisfaction. 
Delivery on time is crucially important in international markets. In latecomer 
countries, where the market power of suppliers may be high or where there are high 
transactions costs of changing suppliers, clients might be more lenient toward delays 
and this creates a challenge for latecomer companies to learn to execute projects 
meeting strictly the deadlines. To be able to do that, they need to develop abilities and 
skills for project management, tracking the work progress throughout the project, 
clarifying project requirements at the very beginning, effective communication 
between parties throughout the project, etc.  
 
To take best advantage of market opportunities, latecomers should develop project 
management skills to manage both small and large scal  projects. Project management 
involves identifying the activities to be undertaken within the project, setting 
deadlines and creating workflow plans, assigning responsibilities, monitoring the 
work progress and delivering quality outcomes within the deadlines. Managing large-
scale projects poses greater challenges for latecomrs. The large scale projects may 
require resources well beyond those under the company’s control, as normally the 
latecomer companies are small-scale and possess limited resources and sometimes 
even limited expertise. If a latecomer company faces the opportunity of executing a 
large-scale project, it has to be able to mobilise the necessary human resources and 
the additional expertise it may need. It also has to be able to coordinate the 
proliferation of tasks that large scale projects produce, a process different in degree if 
not in type from the process of managing smaller-scale projects. Large projects 
require the efficient location of knowledge and other necessary resources as well as 
rapid response and excellence in coordination. Developing capabilities to manage 
large projects appears one of the critical drivers underlining the success of the Indian 
software industry (Athreye, 2005). Being capable of managing large projects the 
latecomers are in a possession of a large pool of resources, which they are able to 
deploy and utilize. When these are coupled with relevant technical expertise and other 
organizational skills, the latecomer software companies are in a position to compete. 
 
Establishing links and relationships with clients, suppliers and other parties, the fifth 
of the organizational capabilities identified, have been identified as vital capabilities 
for latecomer companies, as these provide channels for obtaining information and 
feedback on technological dynamism (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 
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1997). User-producer interactions have been outlined as one of the major drivers for 
generating innovation (von Hippel, 2000), as the usrs possess in-depth understanding 
about the work processes, the performance of the existing technologies and potential 
niches for further developments. In this sense, close interactions with clients can 
generate ideas for modification and improvement in the existing products and 
services. In the case of latecomers, interactions with clients are even more important, 
as the latecomers, being embedded in a latecomer context, have limited information 
about new developments and are away from lead users (Hobday, 1995). Therefore, 
establishing and maintaining links and relationship with clients, foreign ones in 
particular, are important channels for obtaining information about new technological 
developments, feedback and identifying potential niches for further developments. 
Likewise, links with suppliers and other agents in the innovation networks 
(universities, research institutes, consultants, etc.) contribute significantly to the 
accumulation of information about new developments and the latecomer companies 
need to be able to tap also the potential of these sources of information.  
 
Alongside development of the previous five organizational capabilities, latecomer 
companies need to develop marketing capabilities, the sixth of the organizational 
capabilities. The latecomer software companies need to be capable of identifying 
potential clients, approaching them, promoting their in-house capabilities for software 
developments, and maintaining relationships with their clients upon completion of the 
project for further developments, etc. The abilities to market in-house skills and 
expertise are crucial in ensuring the latecomers’ success. Only successful commercial 
application can harness already developed technical and organizational capabilities, 
and allow further expansion. Developing marketing capabilities is often difficult for 
any company, but it is very much the case with the lat comers. The latecomer 
companies may possess (sometimes very) limited knowledge about the structure and 
functioning international markets, which prevent them from being able to identify the 
right approach for entering a particular market, positi ning themselves in the market 
and identifying the right customers. Further, even if successful in all of the above and 
having identified the right clients, the latecomer may fail in approaching and 
establishing contacts with them for a variety of reasons. In the domestic market, the 
latecomers have access to local customers with whom t eir share the same cultural 
and business background, which makes establishment and maintaining contacts 
easier. This does not hold for the international customers, where the latecomers need 
to build relationship, taking into account international business ethics and 
management, and dealing with inter-cultural differenc s such as different norms or 
even beliefs. Thus, developing skills in international business management becomes 
one of the prerequisites for latecomers’ success.   
 
Capabilities to utilize the in-house expertise involve not only finding clients for 
existing products and services but also identifying iches for potential new 
developments. Capabilities to monitor technical change and to identify niches for 
potential developments are the seventh of the organizational capabilities identified in 
the proposed framework. They require not only marketing expertise, but also draw 
heavily on the accumulation of technical expertise. To become competitive and 
sustain its competitive position any company (and particularly a company in a high-
tech sector) needs to keep abreast with the new technological developments. To 
achieve that, the companies need to stretch their capabilities beyond mere monitoring 
of technological development. They need to develop in-depth knowledge and 
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understanding about technological development to be abl  to identify potential niches 
for new developments. Latecomers are confronted by the challenge of building the 
necessary technical and organizational expertise to master the existing frontier 
technological developments, and some of them may well remain far behind in 
managing the existing frontier developments. Developing capabilities to identify 
potential niches for new developments require further deliberate, focused and 
persistent efforts to expand the technical expertise and organizational abilities, to 
reach a definitive level of technological mastery enabling companies to foresee trends 
of development and to identify niches for potential new applications. Being embedded 
in a context, which does not expose them to the latest technological developments, 
and being away from lead users, latecomers may well find this to be a difficult task. 
 
The last of the critical organizational capabilities is strategic thinking. In their 
business activities the latecomer companies need to apply strategic vision of where 
the company is going in a longer term. The ability to think in a strategic way 
underpins latecomers’ success. Ernst (1998) identifi s it as one of the five 
technological capabilities which latecomers need to evelop. The managers need to 
have a clear vision what the company is aiming to accomplish in the future so they are 
able to prepare and undertake the intermediate steps towards the final goal. In setting 
their goals the latecomer companies are to take into account their standing with 
respect to the development of the world industry. Questions like ‘where do the 
products and services offered by the company position with respect to development of 
the world industry’, ‘in what direction and how the company can upgrade’, etc. must 
be answered to achieve a sustainable position in the in ernational market.  It would be 
a mistake to assume that the latecomers should aim to position themselves as 
competing against the world players, as these may be quite unrealistic. As the Arora 
and Gambardella (2005) study suggests, the success in development of latecomer 
software industries lies in finding a niche in which the latecomers have a competitive 
advantage. To be able to identify an appropriate niche the latecomers have to have a 
deep understanding about the technological development of the world software 
industry and its trends, and the position, which the latecomers hold with respect to 
technological and organizational expertise and market strategy. Such assessment 
should adopt a dynamic perspective to re-assess changes over time. Once they have 
the vision set, the latecomers need to pursue theiraim by undertaking the steps 
leading towards it. These would involve strategic ations like establishing 
partnerships, building new expertise and expanding existing knowledge, and the like.  
 
5. Conclusions and directions for further research 
This paper contributes to the existing body of litera ure by suggesting an approach for 
analyzing technological capabilities in a latecomer software industry. The proposed 
approach outlines and disentangles a wide array of technical and organizational 
capabilities, which the latecomer software companies n ed to build, if they are to 
develop internationally competitive software industries based on indigenous 
resources. The paper also contributes to the field of technological development in the 
latecomer context by developing a systematic approach for analysing the array of 
organizational capabilities associated with technological capabilities building.  
 
The main propositions advanced by this paper highlight that development of 
indigenous latecomer software industries is a daunting task for the latecomers, as 
technological capabilities building is uncertain and complex process, involving 
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development of a number of interrelated elements (e.g. t chnical and organizational 
capabilities), which may be poorly developed indiviually or in their integrity in the 
latecomer context. By disentangling the wide variety of technical and organizational 
capabilities required for a latecomer software company to develop successfully, the 
paper improves significantly our understanding about the prerequisites for 
development of indigenous software industries in the latecomer context and suggests 
that some of the existing academic and policy views need be enriched. While 
discussing the possibilities for development of latecomer indigenous software 
industries, the studies need to take into account the wide array of technical and 
organizational capabilities, which the latecomer companies need to build, and the 
complexity of technological development in the latecomer context, and to assess the 
achievements and challenges in the capabilities building process. Public policies 
aiming to support development of latecomer indigenous software industries need to 
go beyond building infrastructures (telecommunication, technological infrastructure, 
education, etc.), and should focus on capabilities building in the latecomer companies. 
They should facilitate accumulation of technical capabilities but also (more so) 
organizational capabilities, as the latter are critical for harnessing the potential in the 
company and at the same time may be difficult to develop in the latecomer context. 
 
The proposed approach opens avenues for investigation of technological capabilities 
and for comparison between different levels and patterns in their accumulation. One 
direction of research is to analyze the accumulated technological capabilities in 
latecomer software industries, which follow different paths of development. For 
example, it would be appealing to explore the accumulation of technological 
capabilities in a latecomer software industry, which is actively involved in 
outsourcing (like India, for example), and to compare these with the accumulation of 
technological capabilities in a latecomer software industry, which attempts to develop 
own software products and services (like Brazil, for example), and to investigate 
whether different patterns of accumulation of technological capabilities emerge. 
Another direction of research is to compare successful and less successful software 
companies in order to outline the capabilities thatappear critical and those that appear 
difficult to develop in the process of technological pabilities building. The third 
direction of research is not confined only to the software industry and calls for in-
depth analyses of the impact of the organizational capabilities in the process of 
technological capabilities building. In all of these cases, the framework offered here 
provides a comprehensive foundation for examining the range of capabilities required 
for achieving a sustainable market position – either in the process of entering into 
selected niches in international markets or creating he capabilities to retain an 
advantage in domestic markets against competition a home and from abroad. 
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Notes: 
                                               
1 Very few latecomer companies have managed to enter i t national markets not only in software 
activities but also in the whole range of activities of new technology based firms, which illustrates the 
difficulties in building technological capabilities in new technological areas, and also influence of other 
entry factors and developments. 
2  The philosophy underlying the development of taxonomies of technological capabilities is to 
disentangle the constituent capabilities, which the lat comers need to develop, and in this sense it 
contributes to making technological capability observable to a greater extent than before. The analyses 
of capabilities development by following taxonomies are coupled with indicators for export intensity 
and patterns of penetration in international markets in order to make the analyses more robust. 
